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Introduction 
The concepts of “normalization” and “discipline” have received increasing attention in disability 
studies and philosophy of disability, due in large part to growing interest throughout the humanities 
and social sciences in the work of Michel Foucault. These theoretical debates are both complex 
and important for understanding disability.  This entry offers some background of the term normal 
and its relation to normalization and discipline, provides an overview of Foucault’s claims about 
normalization and discipline, and indicates some of the distinct ways that disability theorists have 
used the concept of normalization in disability theory.  
 
Background 
In a number of places, Foucault aimed to show that normalization and discipline are vital 
mechanisms of a relatively recent form of power that he called “biopower”. Foucault described 
biopower in this way:  
 
By [biopower] I mean a number of phenomena that seem to me to be significant, 
namely, the set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the 
human species became the object of a political strategy, of a general strategy of power, 
or, in other words, how, starting from the eighteenth century, modern Western societies 
took on board the fundamental biological fact that human beings are a species. (2007, 
1) 
 
Overview of Foucault’s Claims 
Foucault argued that the consolidation of the modern concept of “normal” legitimized and occurred 
in tandem with the new statistical knowledge and other techniques of population management that 
stemmed from biopower. The norm accomplished this expansion of power in two ways: (1) by 
enabling discipline to develop from a simple set of constraints into a mechanism; and (2) by 
transforming the negative restraints of the juridical into the more positive controls of 
normalization. Foucault regarded normalization as a central—if not the central—strategy of 
biopower’s management of “life”. Foucault claimed that, beginning in the eighteenth century, the 
power of the normal has combined with other powers such as the law and tradition, imposing new 
limits upon them. The normal, he explained, was established as a principle of coercion through the 
introduction of standardized education; through the organization of national medical professions 
and hospital systems that could circulate general norms of health; and through the standardization 
of industrial processes and products and manufacturing techniques.  
 
Ian Hacking (1990) has noted that the first meaning of normal that any current English dictionary 
provides is something like “usual, regular, common, typical.” According to the Oxford English 
Dictionary, this usage became current after 1840, with the first citation of “normal, or typical” 
appearing in 1828. Hacking has noted that the modern sense of the word normal was not, however, 
furnished by education or cloistered study, but rather, by the study of life (161-162). Hacking 
explained that the word normal became indispensable because it provided a way to be objective 
about human beings, especially given the inseparability of the notion of normal from its opposite, 
namely, the pathological. The word normal, he wrote, “uses a power as old as Aristotle to bridge 
the fact/value distinction, whispering in your ear that what is normal is also all right” (160). 
Hacking has also pointed out that although the normal stands “indifferently for what is typical, the 
unenthusiastic objective average, it also stands for what has been, good health, and what shall be, 
our chosen destiny” (169). It is especially noteworthy for disability studies that, as Hacking noted, 
our modern usage of the word normal evolved in a medical context.  
 
In the late 1700s, there was a significant reconfiguration of the concept of the pathological and its 
relation to the normal. Disease came to be regarded as an attribute of individual organs, rather than 
as a characteristic of the entire body. Pathology, likewise, became the study of unhealthy organs, 
rather than the study of sick or diseased bodies. Unhealthy organs could be investigated, in part, 
by the chemistry of fluids, such as urine or mucus, that actual living beings secreted. The concept 
of the normal came into being as the inverse of this concept of pathology: a given state of affairs 
or process of the body was normal if it was not associated with a pathological organ. The 
pathological became defined as deviation from the normal and all variation became characterized 
as variation from the normal state. Pathology was no longer conceived as different in kind from 
the normal, but rather as continuous with, and as a deviation from, the normal (164). This new 
understanding of the normal and the pathological that emerged in the late 1700s is one, but only 
one, component of what Shelley Tremain has referred to as “the diagnostic style of reasoning” (see 
Tremain 2010, 2015), which is a style of reasoning that has enabled the consolidation and 
expansion of biopower.  
 
Foucault (1977) argued that normalization thus became one of the great instruments of power at 
the close of the classical age, that is, the power that the norm harnessed was shaped through the 
disciplines that began to emerge at this historical moment (184). From the end of the eighteenth 
century, the indicators of social status, privilege, and group affiliation have been increasingly 
supplemented, if not replaced, by a range of degrees of normality that simultaneously indicate 
membership in a homogeneous social body (viz. a population) and serve to distinguish between 
subjects, divide them from each other, classify them, categorize them in a number of ways, and 
rank them in a host of hierarchies. In Discipline and Punish (1977), Foucault noted that 
normalization initially emerged in the eighteenth-century military school, orphanages, and 
boarding schools as an effective form of punishment. In Foucault’s terms, discipline is neither an 
institution, nor an apparatus, but rather a particular type of power and a modality for its exercise, 
comprising a whole set of instruments, techniques, procedures, levels of application, and targets. 
Discipline is an “anatomy” of power, a technology of power that may be assumed by (1) particular 
institutions—such as, schools or hospitals—in order to achieve a certain end; or (2) authorities that 
use it as a means to reinforce and reorganize their established means of power; or (3) apparatuses 
that use it as their mode of functioning; or (4) state apparatuses whose primary function is to assure 
that discipline reigns over society in general—that is, the police (215-216). As a technology that 
facilitated the expansion of biopower, disciplinary normalization aims to make the body more 
efficient and calculated in its acts, movements, gesture, and expression, to produce a body that is 
“docile,” that is, a body that can be subjected, used, transformed, and improved. Modern discipline 
can be summed up thus: it enables subjects to act in order to constrain them.  
 
Foucault (1977) claimed that disciplinary “punishment,”—that is, normalization—has brought 
into play five distinct normalizing operations: first, individual actions are referred to a totality that 
is simultaneously a field of comparison, a space of differentiation, and a rule to be followed; 
second, individuals are in turn differentiated from each other in relation to this rule which functions 
as a minimal threshold, as an average, or as an optimal outcome towards which individuals must 
move; third, the natures, grades and levels, and abilities of individuals are hierarchized and 
quantified; fourth, these quantifying and hierarchizing measures introduce the constraint of a 
conformity that must be achieved; fifth, the limit of difference, the far side of “the abnormal” that 
will define difference per se in relation to all other specific differences, is codified and enforced 
by penalty (correction, segregation, and so on). The five elemental modes of normalization are 
thus: comparison, differentiation, hierarchy, homogeneity, exclusion. The punitive impulse that 
regulates normalization compares, differentiates, hierarchizes, and excludes individuals in order 
to homogenize a population that, by virtue of its homogeneity, can be more effectively utilized and 
modified. In short, the disciplinary power of the norm relies upon coercion, rather than open 
repression or violence (215-220).  
 
Disability Theorists and Normalization 
Due to its inescapable historical association with pathologization and coercive correction, the idea 
of normalization has a checkered past in disability theory and research. In the last decades of the 
twentieth century, some disability theorists and researchers promoted the idea of normalization as 
emancipatory, both individually and socially, and as a sign of both personal and social progress. 
Most notably, Wolf Wolfensberger gave birth to a social movement, grounded in the 
“normalization principle,” that denounced the forced institutionalization of “cognitively impaired 
people.” The “normalization movement” aimed to integrate these people into the wider community 
by enhancing their self-perceptions and abilities to advocate for themselves and transforming their 
appearances in order to make them more socially accepted (Yates 2015). Michael Oliver explained 
the principle upon which the normalization movement relied, in this way: “Normalization theory 
offers disabled people the opportunity to be given valued social roles in an unequal society which 
values some roles more than others” (Oliver, in Drinkwater 2015, 233). The normalization 
principle was eventually renamed “social role valorization” in order to stress the normativity of 
normalization. Chris Drinkwater (2015) has argued, however, that although normalization theory 
was renamed social role valorization, the power-knowledge regime that is productive of a “normal 
life” remained unexamined. As Drinkwater explained it, the motivational assumption that 
underlies these normalizing strategies is that certain people find it difficult to learn how to behave 
“appropriately,” that is, normally. Drinkwater argues that a more tacit assumption that underlies 
social role valorization is that these people ought to learn normal (valued) behaviors in order to 
acquire normal (that is, valued) lifestyles (233).  
 
 
Conclusion and Future Directions  
In Foucault’s 1978–79 lecture course at the Collège de France (later published in English as The 
Birth of Biopolitics), he linked his claims about the historical emergence of biopower and its 
objects with his approach to the theme of government (Foucault 2008). Recall that, for Foucault, 
modern power is productive rather than merely repressive: it produces objects and induces effects. 
Foucault argued that power is more a question of “government,” that is, the direction of conduct, 
than it is a question of confrontation between adversaries. Foucault used the term government in 
this sixteenth-century sense to refer to the art of government, that is, any form of activity that aims 
to shape, guide, or affect the conduct of oneself or someone else, proposing that the term be 
defined, in general, to mean “the conduct of conduct” (1982). In an important 1982 interview, 
Foucault explained that he adopted this earlier, broad meaning of the term government because it 
encompasses both calculated modes of action that structure the field of possible action of oneself 
or other people and legitimately constituted forms of political and economic subjection. Analyses 
of force relations that construe power as government, that is, as the direction of conduct, take into 
consideration innumerable practices that have previously been assumed to fall outside the scope 
of power—including technologies of normalization that act as mechanisms for the systematic 
objectivization of subjects as (for instance) deaf, criminal, and mad, and techniques of self-
improvement and self-transformation (technologies of the self) such as weight-loss programs and 
fitness regimes, assertiveness training, botox injections, breast implants, psychotherapy, and 
rehabilitation—in addition to recognizably power-laden procedures and practices such as state-
generated prohibitions and punishments and global networks of social, economic, and political 
stratification, the deleterious effects of which congeal disproportionately along disabling, 
racialized, and gendered lines. Foucault maintained that although power appears to be merely 
repressive, the most effective exercise of power consists in guiding the possibilities of conduct and 
putting in order the possible outcomes. Thus, Foucault’s work on normalization and government 
instructs disability theorists and activists to develop new ways to resist and subvert the increasingly 
novel strategies and mechanisms that power produces, as well as to move beyond the confines of 
social models of disability that rely upon outdated and parochial notions of power as fundamentally 
repressive. 
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